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In Horne v. Department of Agriculture (“Horne II”), 1 the Supreme
Court relieved Marvin and Laura Horne of financial penalties for violating
the rules governing the Department of Agriculture’s raisin marketing
program, reasoning that enforcement of the rules would have resulted in a
“taking” of their raisins under the Fifth Amendment. 2 Widely viewed as a
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1. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). Horne II follows an earlier Supreme Court decision in the same
case, Horne v. USDA. (“Horne I”), 133 S. Ct. 2054 (2013) discussed infra at notes 33–37 and
accompanying text.
2. Id.
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strange, slightly comedic legal controversy, 3 the Horne case is likely to
have ramifications extending far beyond the world of raisins. In particular,
the case raises important questions about how the Takings Clause applies,
in general, to personal property—from patents to cigarettes to drugs to
firearms. In our view, the Court majority badly mishandled the case given
the record before the Court, applicable precedent, and established takings
principles. However, as we explain below, the Court’s analysis is so
confused and confusing that it remains to be seen how much change or
damage to established takings doctrine will flow from the Horne II
decision.
At the same time, the Court’s decision contains a remarkable silver
lining from the point of view of government regulators responsible for
enforcing wildlife regulations: a ringing affirmation of the venerable but
sometimes misunderstood doctrine of sovereign ownership of wildlife. The
biggest surprise coming out of this apparently pro-property rights decision
is that regulators now have a powerful defense against allegations that the
federal Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) 4 and other similar federal or state
laws result in compensable takings.
This Essay proceeds as follows. The first Section describes the basic
elements of the raisin marketing program and the convoluted course of the
Horne litigation. As will become apparent, laying out these details is
necessary in order to explain how badly the Court went astray. The second
Section identifies the major mistakes the Court made in deciding this case.
These include (1) failing to recognize that the Hornes, in their capacity as
raisin “handlers,” held no property interest in any raisins, and therefore their
takings argument should have failed at the threshold; (2) failing to honor
the common sense distinction between personal and real property under the
Takings Clause previously recognized by the Court; (3) failing to consider
the substantial offsetting benefits conferred on the Hornes by the raisin
marketing program for the purpose of determining whether the Hornes were
threatened with an unconstitutional taking “without just compensation”; 5
and (4) failing to recognize (assuming the takings argument was otherwise
viable) that the merits of the argument should have been assessed under the
standards of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 6 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard. 7

3. See, e.g., The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Raisin Growers Lawsuit (Comedy Central
television broadcast Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.cc.com/video-clips/pmrodj/the-daily-show-withjon-stewart-raisin-growers-lawsuit (parodying Horne I).
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
7. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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The third Section of this Essay focuses on the case’s silver lining: the
Court’s surprising reaffirmation of the doctrine of sovereign ownership of
wildlife. The Hornes’ convoluted arguments and the Court’s misguided
reasoning help explain why the Court’s conservative majority found itself
in the odd position of having to affirm this venerable doctrine in order to
grant the Hornes victory in the case. Nonetheless, the Court’s reaffirmation
of the doctrine is very real and will likely serve as a powerful precedent
insulating federal and state wildlife regulation from successful takings
claims. We contend that the Horne II decision’s long-term significance lies
in the Court’s reaffirmation of state sovereign ownership of wildlife, not in
the decision’s problematic expansion of the Court’s per se takings rule to
certain kinds of personality.
Before examining the details of the case, one procedural oddity of the
litigation requires highlighting to make the following description and
analysis of the case clear. A takings claim against the United States is
typically litigated by filing a claim for just compensation in the U.S. Court
of Federal Claims, followed by a potential appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and then followed by possible review on a
writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. 8 In this case, however,
following extensive administrative proceedings, the takings issue was
litigated in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California,9
followed by an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 10
and then on to the U.S. Supreme Court. 11 The Department of Agriculture
initiated the litigation as an enforcement proceeding to impose monetary
penalties on the Hornes for failing to comply with the rules governing the
reserve raisin marketing program. 12 The Hornes presented various defenses
to the penalties, including claiming that they would have suffered a taking
of their property interests in raisins had they complied with the program
rules.
In an ordinary case, the Hornes would have been barred from raising
the Takings Clause as a defense in district court on the ground that their
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort.”). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2012) (granting the district courts
jurisdiction concurrent with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims over monetary claims against the
United States not exceeding $10,000).
9. Horne v. USDA, No. CV-F-08-1549-LJO-SMS, 2009 WL 4895362, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
11, 2009), aff’d, 673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013), remanded to 750
F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
10. Horne v. USDA, 673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013), remanded
to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
11. Horne I, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013).
12. 7 C.F.R. § 989 (1949).
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exclusive remedy for the alleged taking was a suit seeking just
compensation in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 13 However, in an earlier
decision in this same case (Horne I), issued in 2013, the Supreme Court
ruled that the unusual statutory provisions 14 governing judicial review of
enforcement proceedings arising from this agriculture marketing program
grant district courts jurisdiction to consider constitutional (including
takings) defenses to a penalty, impliedly repealing the ordinarily exclusive
jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims over takings issues. 15
Thus, while parties challenging government action as a taking ordinarily
must sue for compensation in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the Hornes,
in this unusual case, were permitted to raise their takings argument as a
defense to the enforcement action filed in federal district court.
The upshot was that, when the Supreme Court took up the Horne case
for a second time in 2015, no one disputed that the lower courts had
properly exercised jurisdiction over the takings issue. Clearly, the Hornes
had suffered no actual taking of any property interest in raisins because they
defied rules, the enforcement of which, they alleged, would have resulted in
a taking. The Supreme Court addressed the merits of the takings question
by asking whether there would have been a taking of the Hornes’ property
without just compensation if the Hornes had complied with the program
rules. While clear enough in theory, the unusual procedural posture of the
takings issue undoubtedly contributed to the Court’s confusion about this
case, as we discuss below.

13. See Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990) (“[T]aking claims against the Federal
Government are premature until the property owner has availed itself of the process provided by
the Tucker Act.” (quoting Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 195 (1985))); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127–28 (1985)
(“[E]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property for a public use,
duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sovereign
subsequent to a taking.” (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984))).
14. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 608c(15)(A)–(B) (2012) (“Any handler subject to an order may file a
written petition with the Secretary of Agriculture . . . . The District Courts of the United States in
any district in which such handler is an inhabitant . . . are hereby vested with jurisdiction . . . .”).
15. Horne I, 133 S. Ct. at 2063 (“Under the AMAA’s [Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act] comprehensive remedial scheme, handlers may challenge the content, applicability, and
enforcement of marketing orders. Pursuant to § 608c(15)(A)–(B), a handler may file with the
Secretary a direct challenge to a marketing order and its applicability to him. We have held that
‘any handler’ subject to a marketing order must raise any challenges to the order, including
constitutional challenges, in administrative proceedings. Once the Secretary issues a ruling, the
federal district court where the ‘handler is an inhabitant, or has his principal place of business’ is
‘vested with jurisdiction . . . to review [the] ruling.’ These statutory provisions afford handlers a
ready avenue to bring takings claim against the USDA. We thus conclude that the AMAA
withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over petitioners’ takings claim. Petitioners (as handlers) have
no alternative remedy, and their takings claim was not ‘premature’ when presented to the Ninth
Circuit.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (first citing see United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S.
287, 294 (1946); and then quoting 7 U.S.C. 608c(15)(B) (2012))).
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I. THE RAISIN MARKETING PROGRAM AND THE HORNE LITIGATION
Congress adopted the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937
(“AMAA”) 16 in response to painful economic conditions in rural America
brought about by low and fluctuating commodity prices during the Great
Depression. 17 The Act authorizes the issuance of so-called “marketing
orders” designed to stabilize prices. Under the Raisin Marketing Order, 18
adopted in 1949, the market stabilization function is carried out by the
Raisin Administrative Committee (“RAC”), a governmental entity
composed mostly of growers and others in the raisin business appointed by
the Secretary of Agriculture. 19 In periods of excess raisin production, the
RAC is authorized to require growers to set aside a portion of their crops
“for the account” of the RAC (i.e., the government). 20 The RAC then
disposes of the reserve raisins by donating them or selling them in
noncompetitive markets. The economic principle underlying the program is
that constraining the market supply of raisins will tend to drive prices up, to
the benefit of raisin growers. 21
The marketing program draws an important distinction between raisin
“producers” (who grow raisins), 22 and raisin “handlers” (who process and
pack raisins). 23 Under the regulations, a single individual can, at different
times, wear each of these hats. Raisin handlers are responsible for
physically holding raisins in reserve on behalf of the RAC, and are
potentially subject to penalties for failing to comply with the marketing
program regulations. Raisin producers, after physically handing over their
raisins to handlers, retain an interest in any net proceeds from the RAC’s
disposition of the raisins, less the RAC’s administrative expenses. Unlike
handlers, producers are not directly subject to regulation (or potential
penalties) under the marketing program.
The Hornes, raisin farmers with a decidedly libertarian bent, objected
to the longstanding raisin marketing program as an unreasonable intrusion

16. 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (2012).
17. This description of the Department of Agriculture’s raisin marketing program is drawn
largely from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Horne I and Horne II.
18. 7 C.F.R. § 989 (1949).
19. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2015).
20. Id. at 2428 (quoting 7 C.F.R. § 989.66(a) (2015)).
21. Horne v. USDA., No. CV-F-08-1549-LJO-SMS, 2009 WL 4895362, at *23 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 11, 2009) (“[T]he ‘primary focus’ of the market control program is to ‘maximize return to
the grower.’” (quoting Daniel Bensing, The Promulgation and Implementation of Federal
Marketing Orders Regulating Fruit and Vegetable Crops Under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937, 5 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 3, 6 (1995)), aff’d, 673 F.3d 1071 (9th
Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013), remanded to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135
S. Ct. 2419 (2015)).
22. 7 C.F.R. § 989.11 (1949).
23. Id. at § 989.15.
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into their business affairs. 24 In an attempt to evade the program’s rules, and
in particular to avoid having to comply with the reserve requirement, the
Hornes developed a new business model they believed would allow them
(and some of their like-minded neighbors) to grow, process, and sell raisins
without being subject to the marketing program rules. The Hornes’
principle legal strategy was to structure their business operations so that in
the course of processing raisins they did not become the legal owners of any
raisins. The Department of Agriculture’s rules define a handler subject to
regulation under the marketing program as someone who “acquires”
raisins. 25 The Hornes believed that if they did not become the legal owners
of the raisins they processed, they would not “acquire” raisins within the
meaning of the regulations. 26 In other words, although the Hornes took
physical possession of the raisins, they believed that because they were
providing processing services on a fee basis for the actual owners (i.e., the
producers), they could not be handlers. 27 In accord with this scheme, the
Hornes proceeded to process raisins they grew themselves and raisins that
were grown by other producers without complying with the reserve
requirement. The Hornes then sold their entire crop on the open market,
and the other raisin producers for whom they provided processing services
24. As the Court explained in Horne I:
The Hornes wrote the Secretary and to the RAC in 2002 setting out their grievances:
“[W]e are growers that will pack and market our raisins. We reserve our rights under
the Constitution of the United States . . . . [T]he Marketing Order Regulating Raisins
has become a tool for grower bankruptcy, poverty, and involuntary servitude. The
Marketing Order Regulating Raisins is a complete failure for growers, handlers, and the
USDA . . . . [W]e will not relinquish ownership of our crop. We put forth the money
and effort to grow it, not the Raisin Administrative Committee. This is America, not a
communist state.”
133 S. Ct. at 2057 n.3 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 60a, Horne I, 133 S.
Ct. 2053 (2013) (No. 12-123)).
25. 7 C.F.R. § 989.15 (2015) (defining a “handler” as any “processor or packer” of raisins); 7
C.F.R. § 989.13 (2015) (defining a “processor” as “any person who receives or acquires” raisins).
The Hornes also contended that they were not “handlers” because they did not meet the definition
of a “packer.” See 7 C.F.R. § 989.14 (2015) (defining a “packer” as “any person who, within the
area, stems, sorts, cleans, or seeds raisins, grades stemmed raisins, or packages raisins for market
as raisins . . . .”). The Hornes’ contention that they were not handlers was rejected at every step
of the administrative and judicial review process. See, e g., Marvin D. Horne, Laura R. Horne, et
al., 65 Agric. Dec. 805, 816 (U.S.D.A. 2006) (indicating that the Hornes were indeed “handlers”).
26. Marvin D. Horne, Laura R. Horne, et al., 65 Agric. Dec. 805, 816 (U.S.D.A. 2006)
(“Respondents dispute that they are handlers in that they never obtained any raisins through
purchase or transfer of ownership to any of the business entities that they operate and argue,
therefore, they did not acquire raisins within the meaning of the Raisin Order.”).
27. See, e.g., Horne v. USDA., No. CV-F-08-1549-LJO-SMS, 2009 WL 4895362, at *4
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) (“According to Plaintiffs, Raisin Valley Marketing sold raisins on
behalf of its members, while the growers maintained ownership. According to Mr. Horne, Raisin
Valley Marketing held grower sales funds in a trust account, paid Lassen Vineyards for the use of
their equipment, paid a third party broker fee, and distributed the net proceeds to the growers.”),
aff’d, 673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013), remanded to 750 F.3d 1128
(9th Cir. 2014), 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
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sold the entirety of their crops on the open market as well. As a result of
this scheme, the Hornes (and their confederates) reaped a larger financial
return from their raisin crops than other growers who complied with the
regulations and dutifully reserved a portion of their crops for the RAC. 28
The Department responded to the Hornes’ actions by initiating an
administrative proceeding to impose penalties on them based on the dollar
value of the raisins the Hornes failed to turn over to the RAC as well as for
violations of various other rules applicable to handlers. The Hornes’
defenses against the sanctions failed at every step in the administrative
process and on subsequent review in the federal courts—until the Supreme
Court. In accord with their novel business plan, the Hornes’ principal
argument at the outset and throughout most of the litigation was that they
did not own the raisins, and therefore they were not “handlers” and could
not be charged with violating the rules applicable to handlers. The Hornes
also argued, beginning at later stages of the litigation, that had they
complied with the reserve requirement, the regulation would have
constituted a taking under the Takings Clause.
When this convoluted case first reached the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, the court issued a decision rejecting all of the Hornes’
defenses and upholding the penalties.29 Accepting the position of the
Department on the statutory issue, the court said it did not matter that the
Hornes were not the legal owners of raisins they processed; to become
handlers who had “acquired” raisins it was sufficient that they took physical
custody of the raisins. There was no doubt the Hornes gained physical
custody of the raisins in order to process them. The court also rejected their
takings argument: one of the Ninth Circuit’s rationales was that the Hornes
could properly be compelled to comply with the reserve requirement
because they had voluntarily decided to enter the raisin business.30
In response to a petition for rehearing filed by the Hornes objecting to
the court’s voluntariness theory, 31 the same panel of Ninth Circuit judges
28. See Marvin D. Horne, Laura R. Horne, et al., 65 Agric. Dec. 805, 815–16 (U.S.D.A.
2006) (“[B]y avoiding the requirements of the Raisin Order . . . respondents obtained an unfair
competitive advantage over everyone in the raisin industry who complied with the Raisin Order
and its regulations. That is what this proceeding is really about.”).
29. Horne v. USDA., No. 10-15270, 2011 WL 2988902 (9th Cir. July 25, 2011), opinion
amended and superseded, 673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013), remanded
to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), ECF No. 25-1, rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015),
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/07/25/10-15270.pdf.
30. Id. at 9470 (“Far from compelling a physical taking of the Hornes’ tangible property, the
Raisin Marketing Order applies to the Hornes only insofar as they voluntarily chose to send their
raisins into the stream of interstate commerce.”).
31. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3–4, Horne I, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013) (No. 12-123),
2012 WL 3058322, at *3–4 (“A panel of the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed the judgment of the
District Court on the merits. The panel reasoned that the regulatory scheme’s requirement that
petitioners forfeit a substantial portion of their raisin crop to the government was not a taking for
which just compensation is due because the regulation ‘applies to [petitioners] only insofar as they
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issued a new, superseding opinion. 32 The panel’s decision on rehearing
again rejected the statutory handler argument, using the same reasoning as
in the initial decision. But the panel took an entirely new tack on the
takings issue, abandoning the voluntariness theory and adopting the view
that the court had no business addressing the merits of the takings argument
in the first place. The panel ruled that the federal district court (and the
Ninth Circuit on appeal) lacked jurisdiction to consider the takings
argument as a defense in an enforcement action because the Hornes could
and should have pursued their takings argument by filing a lawsuit for just
compensation in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
The Hornes, now represented by expert Supreme Court counsel, 33 filed
a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court focused on the Ninth Circuit’s
disposition of the takings issue. The Court proceeded to grant the petition,
and reversed the Ninth Circuit in Horne I. 34 As discussed above, 35 the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, ruled that under the
judicial review provisions applicable to this agricultural marketing program,
the district court had jurisdiction to address the Hornes’ constitutional
challenges (including takings). The Court determined that because the
Department had brought this enforcement action against the Hornes on the
theory that they were handlers, and the Department had succeeded on that
argument, the Hornes necessarily were raising their takings defense to the
penalties solely in their capacity as handlers.36 Based on this analysis, the
Court determined that the Hornes, in their capacity as handlers, were
entitled to a resolution of the merits of their takings argument in the Ninth
Circuit, and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. 37
voluntarily choose to send their raisins into the stream of interstate commerce.’ After petitioners
filed a rehearing petition pointing out that the panel opinion was inconsistent with Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 n.17 (1982), the panel abruptly changed
course and held . . . that the court lacked jurisdiction over the takings issue.” (citation omitted)
(quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ at Certiorari at 43a, Horne I, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013) (No.
12-123)), remanded to 750 F. 3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) .
32. Horne v. USDA, 673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013), remanded
to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
33. Michael W. McConnell, who represented the Hornes before the U.S. Supreme Court, has
argued before the U.S. Supreme Court a total of fourteen times, is Of Counsel with the firm
Kirkland & Ellis, and formerly served as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
LAW
SCHOOL,
Circuit.
See
Michael
W.
McConnell,
STANFORD
https://law.stanford.edu/directory/michael-w-mcconnell/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2015).
34. Horne I, 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2056 (2013).
35. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
36. Horne I, 133 S. Ct. at 2060 (“It is undisputed that the Marketing Order imposes duties on
petitioners only in their capacity as handlers. As a result, any defense raised against those duties
is necessarily raised in that same capacity.”).
37. Id. at 2064. The Court did not dispute that if the Hornes had raised the takings issue in
their capacity as raisin producers (as opposed to handlers), they would have had to seek relief in
the claims court. See id. at 2062 n.7 (“That is not to say that a producer who turns over her
reserve-tonnage raisins could not bring suit for just compensation in the Court of Claims.”).
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On remand, the same panel of Ninth Circuit judges again rejected the
takings argument on the merits, but on different grounds than in the
superseded 2011 decision. 38 The panel surveyed the potentially applicable
takings theories, first stating that a direct appropriation theory did not
apply: “the Hornes cannot—and do not—argue they suffered this sort of
‘paradigmatic taking.’” 39 The panel also rejected a categorical claim under
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 40 reasoning that the
marketing regulations applied to personal property rather than real property,
and in any event the Hornes would not have been deprived of all the
economic value of their property because they retained an interest in the net
proceeds of raisin sales by the RAC. 41
After rejecting these alternative theories, the Ninth Circuit settled on
applying the Nollan/Dolan standards to assess the merits of the Hornes’
takings argument, reasoning that the reserve requirement represented the
same kind of “condition” on conducting a business as the land development
exactions at issue in Nollan and Dolan. 42 The panel had no difficulty
concluding the application of the reserve requirement to the Hornes
satisfied the Nollan/Dolan standards. As to the Nollan “nexus” test, the
panel said, “By reserving a dynamic percentage of raisins annually such that
the domestic raisin supply remains relatively constant, the Marketing Order
program furthers the end advanced: obtaining orderly market conditions.” 43
As to the Dolan “rough proportionality” test, the panel said the reserve
requirement was not simply in “‘rough’ proportion” but was in “more or
less actual proportion” to the goal of achieving market stability: “By
annually modifying the ‘extent’ of the reserve requirement to keep pace
with changing market conditions, the RAC ensures its program does not
overly burden the producer’s ability to compete while reducing to the
producer’s benefit the potential instability of this particular market.” 44
The Hornes once again sought review in the Supreme Court and,
pulling off a rare coup, persuaded the Court to grant a petition for certiorari

38. See Horne v. USDA., 750 F.3d 1128, 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[O]ur observation that the
Secretary has endeavored to preserve as much of the Hornes’ ownership of the raisins as possible,
leads us to conclude the Marketing Order’s reserve requirements—and the provisions permitting
the Secretary to penalize the Hornes for failing to comply with those requirements—do not
constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment.”), cert. granted 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015 (Mem)),
and rev’d 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
39. Id. at 1138.
40. 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (finding that cable television wire on a New York City apartment
worked an unconstitutional taking as a permanent physical occupation).
41. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1139–41.
42. Id. at 1143 (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) and Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)).
43. Id.
44. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391).
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a second time in the same case. 45 In Horne II, the Court, in an opinion by
Chief Justice John Roberts, reversed the Ninth Circuit again. 46 First, the
Court decided that the case involved a physical appropriation and that a per
se takings rule governed appropriations involving either real property or
personal property, such as raisins.47 Second, the Court ruled that the
Hornes’ retention of an interest in net proceeds from the RAC’s sale of
raisins did not preclude application of the per se rule. 48 Third, the Court
resolved the final question posed by the petition—“Whether a governmental
mandate to relinquish specific, identifiable property as a ‘condition’ on
permission to engage in commerce effects a per se taking”—by answering
“yes,” “at least in this case.” 49
The Court also declined to accept the Department’s argument
(arguably already disallowed by Horne I) 50 that it should reject the takings
argument because a taking violates the Constitution only if there is no
compensation, and the Hornes were free to seek just compensation in the
claims court. 51 Likewise, the Court rejected the government’s argument
that the case should be remanded to determine whether or not the Hornes
were entitled to any compensation given that the economic burden caused
by the alleged taking likely would have been offset, perhaps in its entirety,
by the benefit the Hornes received from higher prices for the raisins they
sold in the marketplace. 52 Based on all of these conclusions, the Court
ruled that the Hornes should be relieved of the obligation to pay the
penalties imposed on them by the Department of Agriculture.

45. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (Mem).
46. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
47. Id. at 2428.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2430.
50. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
51. Id. at 2431.
52. Id. at 2431–33. One issue the Court might have addressed in Horne II—but did not—was
whether property owners can routinely challenge government regulations as takings in lawsuits
seeking to enjoin the government from acting (or, what amounts to the same thing, defying the
law and resisting resulting penalties by contending that enforcement of the law would have
resulted in a taking). The Hornes urged the Court to adopt a broad view of the remedies available
under the Takings Clause, see Brief for Petitioner at 27–31, Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (No.
14-275), 2015 WL 881767, at *27, and several of the Hornes’ amici also urged the Court to
embrace this position. See, e.g., Brief of the States of Texas, Arizona, and North Dakota as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (No.14-275), 2015 WL
1048421. In Horne II there was no debate the Hornes were entitled to raise the takings issue as a
defense to the sanctions, given the ruling in Horne I that, in this relatively rare instance, the
Hornes, qua handlers, were barred from pursuing ordinary compensatory relief. The Court
avoided addressing the remedy issue raised by the Hornes and their amici presumably because it
was unnecessary to resolve the case. The merits of this remedy issue are debated in Thomas
Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1630 (2015) and John Echeverria,
Eschewing Anticipatory Remedies for Takings: A Reply to Professor Merrill, 128 HARV. L. REV.
202 (2015).
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Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, joining the Court’s opinion
“in full,” but contending that a claim for just compensation likely would
have failed because the alleged taking of raisins by the marketing program
would not have involved a taking for “public use.”53 Justice Breyer, joined
by Justices Kagan and Ginsburg, argued for remanding the case to
determine whether the benefits conferred on the Hornes by the raisin
marketing program exceeded the economic burden imposed on them, such
that they would not have been entitled to any compensation, and therefore
could not oppose the sanctions on the ground that they had been threatened
with a taking “without just compensation.” 54 In solitary dissent, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor argued for affirming the Ninth Circuit, essentially
embracing the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in its last decision that the
marketing order did not threaten to deprive the Hornes of all of their
property interests in the raisins.55 In addition, endorsing the argument
abandoned by the Ninth Circuit four years earlier, she contended that the
government could require giving up of property rights as a condition of a
voluntary entry into a regulated market without effecting a taking. 56
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S ERRORS IN HORNE
For four separate and independent reasons the Supreme Court should
have rejected the conclusion that the Hornes were threatened with a per se
taking and therefore were entitled to avoid the penalties imposed on them
for violating the rules of the raisin marketing program. The Court should
either have affirmed the Ninth Circuit ruling upholding the penalties or
adopted Justice Breyer’s suggestion and remanded the case for additional
proceedings. We examine each of the Court’s errors in turn. 57
53. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2433 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend V).
54. Id. at 2433–36 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend V).
55. Id. at 2437–40 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2440–42.
57. The Department made several arguments before the Supreme Court that were probably
ill-advised, which we are not inclined to defend. First, the Department argued that the reserve
requirement did not result in a per se taking because raisin growers retained the right to any net
proceeds left over after the RAC had disposed of the raisins and covered its administrative
expenses. Brief for Respondent at 24–28, Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (No. 14-275), 2015
WL 1478016, at *24–28. A partial monetary return after a taking has already occurred can
properly count towards the compensation due for the taking, but a partial return represents an
improbable ground for seeking to defeat the claim altogether. By contrast, an integrated
regulatory program, such as a transferable development rights scheme, which simultaneously
restricts the use of some parcels and grants a claimant the right to develop others at higher density,
strikes us as quite different and more easily defended. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 740–42 (1997) (recognizing that transferable developments rights
(“TDRs”) should be considered in assessing the economic effect of a regulatory restriction).
Second, the Department argued that the raisin marketing program could not be a taking
because raisin producers were free to seek just compensation for any taking in a suit filed in the
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A. The Lack of Property
First, the Hornes, as petitioners before the Supreme Court in Horne II,
were not, and never had been, the owners of the raisins at issue, a defect
which should have been fatal to their case. The Takings Clause proscribes
the taking of “private property” for public use without just compensation.
If a takings claimant can point to no property entitlement, her takings case
is dead in the water. 58 Because the Hornes as handlers did not own the
raisins at issue, they should have lost in the Supreme Court.
Yet the Court concluded that the Hornes did “own” the raisins,
including both the raisins they had grown themselves and those grown by
other producers. In the Court’s words, “[t]hey own the raisins they grew
and are handling for themselves, and they own the raisins they handle for
other growers.” 59 This conclusion was patently erroneous based on the
record in the case and the long course of the litigation leading up to the
Court’s decision. By successfully persuading the Court to embrace this
mistaken position, counsel for the Hornes seriously misled the Court.
In Horne II, the threshold ownership issue presented a very specific
question: whether the Hornes, in their capacity as raisin “handlers,” had an
ownership interest in raisins sufficient to support a takings argument. If the
raisin marketing program did not result in a taking of a property interest
held by the Hornes qua handlers, they should have been barred from raising
the takings argument as a defense to the sanctions imposed on them for
failing to comply with the regulations. Because, in fact, the Hornes qua
handlers never owned any raisins, their takings defense should have failed
in the Supreme Court.
To understand the ownership issue in Horne II, recall that in Horne I
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the Hornes’
takings argument for lack of jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit assumed the
Hornes were pursuing their takings argument in their capacity as raisin
“producers.” 60 Based on that understanding, the court ruled that the Hornes
could have pursued the takings issue via a suit for compensation under the
Takings Clause in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 61 Because they had
the option to sue in the claims court, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, the Hornes
U.S. Court of Federal Claims. But in Horne I, the Supreme Court ruled that this suit involved a
challenge to the raisin marketing program brought by petitioners in their capacity as raisin
“handlers” and only as raisin handlers. See Horne I, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013). Given that prior
ruling, it seems unexceptional for the Court to have concluded in Horne II that this suit brought by
the Hornes as handlers could not be defeated by pointing to litigation options available to the
Hornes as raisin producers. See id. at 2431.
58. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
59. See Horne I, 133 S. Ct. at 2431.
60. Horne v. USDA, 673 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013),
remanded to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
61. Id.
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were barred from raising their takings argument in district court (or on
appeal in the Ninth Circuit). 62
In Horne I the Supreme Court reversed that ruling. 63 The Court did
not disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s premise that, if the Hornes had been
pursuing the takings case as producers, they would have been required to
file a takings claim in the claims court.64 Instead, the Court ruled that the
Hornes were presenting their takings argument not as producers, but in the
capacity of handlers, and as handlers the Hornes could raise their takings
argument as a defense to the penalties in federal district court.65
Accordingly, the Supreme Court said that the Ninth Circuit erred in ruling
that the Hornes could not present their takings argument in this case. 66 In
sum, following Horne I, it was crystal clear that the Hornes were litigating
the takings issue in this case only in their capacity as handlers.
It also was clear—or should have been—that, because the Hornes were
pursuing their case as handlers, their takings argument was now doomed to
ultimate failure. The Hornes, qua handlers, never owned any raisins, and
therefore could not claim they had been threatened with a taking of any
property interest in any raisins.67 This is true whether one looks at the issue
through the lens of the regulations the Hornes should have complied with or
the lens of the illegal alternative business model they devised.
On the one hand, if the Hornes had played by the Department’s rules
and embraced their status as handlers, they could not have claimed a taking
of any “reserve” raisins held by them qua handlers. Under the regulations,
when handlers take possession of raisins, title to the raisins automatically
transfers to “the account” of the Raisin Administrative Committee, meaning
that the United States, not the handlers, owns the reserve raisins. 68

62. Id.
63. Horne I, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013).
64. See id.
65. Id. at 2060–61, 2063–64.
66. Id. at 2064.
67. Before the Ninth Court on remand following the ruling in Horne I, the Hornes implicitly
acknowledged their quandary by presenting various strained arguments for why they still could
proceed with their lawsuit, including that they had standing to prosecute their takings arguments
as “bailees.” See Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 5, Horne v. USDA, 750 F.3d 1128 (2012)
(No. 10-15270), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013), remanded to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014) rev’d,
135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). None of the authorities the Hornes cited in support of this imaginative
theory actually support the theory. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (not addressing bailment); Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560,
1572 n.32 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (merely referring to bailment as an illustration of the “diversity” of
property interests).
68. See Horne v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., No. CV-F-08-1549-LJO-SMS, 2009 WL 4895362, at
*24 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) (“Title to the ‘reserve tonnage” portion of the producer’s raisins
automatically transfers to the RAC for sale in secondary, non-competitive markets.”), aff’d, 673
F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013), remanded to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.
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Although producers might allege a taking as a result of the reserve
requirement and the resulting transfer of ownership of raisins from them to
the RAC, a handler could not claim ownership of the reserve raisins or any
property interest in the raisins as a result of the reserve requirement.
Producers could claim some continuing interest in the reserve raisins held
by the RAC because they had a right to any net proceeds from sales of the
raisins by the RAC. 69 But the Hornes, in their capacity as handlers, would
never have had any ownership interest in the raisins.
On the other hand, under the novel business model adopted by the
Hornes, they also were not owners of any of the reserve raisins. As
discussed above, 70 the Hornes’ legal strategy for evading the regulations
applicable to handlers was to avoid becoming the legal owners of the raisins
they were processing. The Hornes believed that if they did not become
owners of any raisins, they would not “acquire” raisins within the meaning
of the marketing program regulations and, therefore, would not fall under
the definition of a handler. 71 If they were not handlers under the
regulations, they would not be exposed to sanctions for failing to comply
with the regulatory requirements applicable to handlers, including the
reserve requirement.
Arguing before the Supreme Court in Horne II that they were the
owners of the raisins, the Hornes not only presented a position that had no
support in law, they contradicted the position they had espoused for most of
the litigation. Up to and including the initial appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the
main issue in the case was whether the Hornes were “handlers” within the
meaning of the regulations. 72 The Hornes contended that they were not
handlers because the rules of the marketing program only apply to handlers,
and the Hornes believed they could escape liability for the penalties
imposed on them by the Department if they could establish they were not
handlers. 73 The Hornes believed they could avoid the label of handler if
they could establish that they were not the owners of any raisins. Thus,
they vociferously and repeatedly argued they were not the legal owners of

2014) rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015); see also Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2015) (“The Raisin
Committee acquires title to the reserve raisins that have been set aside . . . .”).
69. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2439 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
70. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
71. E.g., Marvin D. Horne, Laura R. Horne, et al., 67 Agric. Dec. 18, 19 (U.S.D.A. 2008)
(“Marvin R. Horne and the other respondents dispute that they are handlers claiming they never
obtained any raisins through purchase or transfer of ownership to any of the business entities that
Mr. Horne and his partners operate. Mr. Horne and his partners argue that they did not acquire
raisins within the meaning of the Raisin Order.”).
72. See Horne v. USDA, 673 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013),
aff’d, 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014).
73. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.

2016]

HORNE v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

671

raisins. 74 The Department of Agriculture and the lower courts repeatedly
rejected the Hornes’ argument that they did not meet the statutory definition
of a handler, and the Hornes abandoned the argument by the time their case
reached the Supreme Court. Importantly, however, at no stage in this
lengthy litigation did any party, administrative officer, or court question the
factual accuracy of the premise of the Hornes’ legal argument on the
handler issue, that is, that they were not the owners of any raisins.
The Hornes’ previously held position that they were not the owners of
the raisins had the virtue of being entirely consistent with the novel
business model they developed. The Hornes negotiated contracts with other
growers under which the growers remained the owners of their raisins, and
the Hornes simply provided processing services on a fee basis.75 There is
no basis for questioning the validity or enforceability of these contractual
arrangements. The same conclusion applies, although for a slightly
different reason, to the raisins grown by the Hornes. Of course, the Hornes
owned the raisins they grew themselves in their capacity as raisin
producers. But that does not answer the question whether the Hornes were
the owners of the raisins they produced when they took on the functions of
a handler. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Horne I, a single
individual or firm can be either a producer or a handler at different stages of
the process of producing and distributing raisins. 76 So far as we know,
there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Hornes qua producers
transferred ownership of the raisins they grew to themselves qua handlers.
Such a move would have been exceedingly unlikely because it would have
undercut the Hornes’ main argument throughout the litigation that they
were not handlers because they did not own any raisins.
Before the Supreme Court in Horne II, the Hornes made an about-face
on the ownership question. By that time, their “we-are-not-a-handler”
74. E.g., Brief of Appellants at 15, Horne v. USDA, 673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 1015270) (“No transfer of ownership or control occurred with Respondents’ grown raisins, or raisins
grown by third parties.”), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013), remanded to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.
2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Horne v. USDA, No. CV-F-08-1549-LJOSMS, 2009 WL 4895362 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009), (same) aff’d, 673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012),
rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013), remanded to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419
(2015) (No. CV-F-08-1549-LJO-SMS) (same).
75. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment at 10, Horne v. USDA, No. CV-F-08-1549-LJO-SMS, 2009 WL 4895362
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009), aff’d, 673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053(2013), and
aff’d, 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. CV-F-08-1549-LJO-SMS) (explaining the Hornes’
contractual arrangements with other growers and that the growers “maintain[ed] right, title,
ownership and control of the raisins until they [were] sold to the consumer market”).
76. Horne I, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013) (concluding that the Hornes’ takings argument was ripe
in the Ninth Circuit because the Hornes were making the argument in their “capacity” as handlers
rather than in their “capacity” as producers), remanded to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d,
135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
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statutory argument had fallen by the wayside, eliminating all incentive for
the Hornes to continue to argue that they did not own any raisins. In
addition, in Horne I the Court had clarified that the Hornes could proceed
only with their takings argument in their capacity as handlers. With the
case recast in this fashion, the Hornes’ previous insistence that they were
not the owners of raisins became fatal to their case. In a brazen display of
chutzpah, the Hornes’ Supreme Court counsel abandoned all memory of
their prior position on the ownership issue and asserted a new, opposite
position: that the Hornes, in their capacity as handlers, were in fact the
owners of the raisins. During oral argument, Hornes’ counsel asserted, in
artfully vague and misleading fashion, the following:
[A]s handlers, the Hornes actually assumed the full financial
responsibility for the raisins that were not turned over to the
Department of Agriculture. The producers in this case were fully
paid for their raisins. This is a factual finding to be found in the
judicial officer’s opinion at 66a of the appendix to the—to the
petition. The Hornes paid the producers for their raisins.
According to the judicial officer, those raisins became part of the
inventory of the Hornes. . . . [W]hen the Raisin Administrative
Committee . . . came after the raisins, it was the Hornes and the
Hornes only who bore the economic burden of this taking. 77
Chief Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, relied on this passage
from the oral argument as his sole support for the factual conclusion that the
Hornes, in their capacity as handlers, “owned” raisins. 78 The Chief Justice
might reasonably be faulted for relying on counsel’s vague statements
during oral argument to support such a crucial factual premise for the
Court’s decision. Importantly, both the Department of Agriculture and one
of its amici explicitly explained to the Court that the Hornes qua handlers
could not properly claim ownership of any raisins. 79 Nonetheless, it is
understandable that the Chief Justice may have been misled by counsel’s
argument, since the quote above strongly suggests, if it does not say so
explicitly, that the Hornes acquired ownership of other growers’ raisins in
exchange for payments by the Hornes to these other growers. The reference

77. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–4, Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (No. 14-275),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/14-275_2b8e.pdf.
78. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015).
79. Brief for Respondent, supra note 57, at 52 (“[H]andlers have no property interest in
reserve raisins and face no economic burden from compliance with the marketing order. To be
sure, handlers who flout the reserve requirement, as petitioners did, become subject to civil
sanctions, 7 C.F.R. 989.166(c)—but petitioners’ asserted takings defense to those penalties rests
on the novel proposition that a fine for violation of the reserve requirement cannot lawfully be
imposed against handlers because that requirement effects a taking of someone else’s property.”);
Brief of Amicus Curiae International Municipal Layers Association in Support of Respondent at
6–11, Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (No. 14-275).
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to “inventory” likewise suggests that the Hornes became owners of the
raisins. In fact, in the cited page of the administrative decision, the Judicial
Officer merely observed that in some instances the Hornes accepted
payment from raisin buyers and then either passed that money on to the
growers or deducted that sum from the amount growers owed the Hornes
for processing their raisins. 80 These transactions in no way suggest that the
Hornes became owners of the raisins, and they are entirely consistent with
the Hornes’ business model of providing processing services to others who
were the actual owners of the raisins. Equally important, other passages in
the Judicial Officer’s opinion clearly indicate that the Hornes denied
ownership of the raisins, and the Judicial Officer did not dispute the
correctness of these assertions. 81
It also was misleading for counsel to suggest that the Hornes “bore the
economic burden of this taking.” 82 In terms of actual raisins, neither the
Hornes nor any of their confederate growers could possibly allege to have
suffered a taking: after determining not to allow any of their raisins to be
held in reserve, they sold all of their crops at fair market prices. With
respect to the monetary sanctions, it is certainly correct that the Hornes
were assessed financial penalties for violating the Department’s regulations
applicable to handlers. But bearing a financial penalty for violating a
federal regulation is not the same thing as being subjected to a taking of
private property. Throughout this litigation the Hornes recognized that their
takings challenge to the penalties rested on the theory that the marketing
rules threatened them with a taking of their property interest in the raisins. 83
The Hornes never contended that they suffered any actual economic loss
that would support a takings claim.
At the end of the day, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the
Supreme Court dropped the ball on the ownership issue. The Court decided
the case on the premise that the Hornes qua handlers owned the raisins at
issue, when in fact they did not. Whether the Court was bamboozled on
this issue, or simply chose to uncritically embrace counsel’s ruse, is hard to
say.
One potential response to this critique is that it is technical in nature,
because it boils down to an argument that handlers are powerless to raise a
takings challenge to the raisin marketing program, and that only raisin
producers can raise the takings issue. If the Hornes or some other producer
had proceeded in the proper fashion by filing suit, qua producers, in the

80. Marvin D. Horne, Laura R. Horne, et al., 67 Agric. Dec. 18, 24 (U.S.D.A. 2008).
81. Id. at 19, 35.
82. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 4.
83. See Horne v. USDA, 750 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In effect, the Hornes argue
the constitutionality of the penalty rises or falls with the constitutionality of the Marketing Order’s
reserve requirement.”), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
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claims court, and if the case had reached the Supreme Court through a
different appellate route, the Supreme Court might have reached many of
the same conclusions that it did in Horne II, including that takings claims
based on seizures of personal property, such as raisins, are governed by a
per se rule. So, no harm no foul? Actually, we think not. The Court has an
obligation to pay attention to the facts in the case before it and to follow the
rule of law. When the Court cuts a corner to reach other issues it deems
more important, it undermines the institution and the credibility of its
rulings on those other issues.
B. Personal Versus Real Property
The Supreme Court also should have rejected the Hornes’ takings
argument because it rested on the theory that government appropriations or
seizures of personal property are governed by a categorical, or per se,
takings rule. Under a per se approach, government actions affecting private
property are presumed to be takings, without regard to the various nuanced
factors normally considered in takings analysis. 84 The Ninth Circuit refused
to recognize a per se rule for interferences with the Hornes’ interests in
raisins because raisins represent a form of personal property. 85 But the
Supreme Court reversed and embraced the Hornes’ per se theory, despite
the fact that this ruling violated common sense and the overwhelming
weight of precedent.
First, the Court’s new per se rule appears nonsensical because there are
numerous examples of seizures of personal property that cannot plausibly
be called takings. Some examples include seizures of adulterated drugs by
the Food and Drug Administration, 86 loss of personal private property
through civil or criminal forfeiture actions,87 removal of unwholesome
foods from store shelves by local health officials,88 or the taking away of
abused or otherwise mistreated animals from their owners by local animal

84. See generally Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536–40 (2005) (explicating
the per se takings tests and how they fit into the Court’s takings jurisprudence).
85. See Horne, 750 F.3d 1128.
86. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 304, 21 U.S.C. § 334 (2012) (authorizing FDA
seizure of “[a]ny article of food, drug, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded”).
87. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996) (rejecting claim that seizure of automobile
pursuant to Michigan forfeiture statute represented a taking; “[t]he government may not be
required to compensate an owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired under the
exercise of governmental authority other than the power of eminent domain” (first citing United
States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492 (1973); and then citing United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121,
125 (1967))).
88. N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chi., 211 U.S. 306, 308 (1908) (allowing the seizure,
without prior judicial process, of forty-seven barrels of poultry from a Chicago food storage
warehouse after city inspectors determined they were “putrid, decayed, poisonous or infected in
such a manner as to render it unsafe or unwholesome for human food”).
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control officers. 89 In 2014, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into
law a measure that authorizes the removal of firearms and ammunition from
persons determined to be dangerous to themselves and others.90 Surely, that
statute would not work a compensable taking. Yet the Court’s per se theory
seems to dictate the conclusion that the statute does take private property.
It is possible that in the future the Court will recognize exceptions to
its new per se rule, or otherwise cabin its scope. But Horne II suggested no
exceptions or qualifications to the new per se rule and did not even
acknowledge that the new rule may generate some “hard” cases. In other
takings cases the Court has said that so-called “background principles” of
federal or state law may limit the scope of its per se rules. 91 But as
discussed below, it is not obvious how previously recognized “background
principles” defenses can sensibly be applied to the context of personal
property or how new background principles might be devised for personal
property takings cases. For the moment, the Court has adopted a new per se
rule for personal property that, on its face, is both sweeping in scope and
utterly implausible.
Second, the Court’s new per se rule was inconsistent with the Court’s
prior indications that the Court’s takings analysis applies differently to
personal property than to real property. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, in which the Court held that regulatory restrictions that eliminate
all economically viable uses of land constitute per se takings, the Court
articulated a distinct rule for regulations that destroy the economic value of
personal property: “[I]n the case of personal property, by reason of the
State’s traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, [the
owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even
render his property economically worthless (at least if the property’s only
economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale).”92 The Ninth
Circuit, logically enough, relied on this reasoning in Lucas to support its

89. See, e. g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-41-2(1) (West 2015) (“All courts in the State of
Mississippi may order the seizure of an animal by a law enforcement agency, for its care and
protection upon a finding of probable cause to believe said animal is being cruelly treated,
neglected or abandoned.”).
90. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 18120(b)(1) (West 2016) (“Upon issuance of a gun
violence restraining order issued pursuant to this division, the court shall order the restrained
person to surrender all firearms and ammunition in the restrained person’s custody or control, or
which the restrained person possesses or owns . . . .”); see also Patrick McGreevy, Governor OKs
Temporary Gun Seizures from People Judged to be a Danger, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2014),
http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-california-jerry-brown-gun-seizures-20140929story.html (describing the legislative debate over AB 1014).
91. See, e.g., Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
92. 505 U.S. at 1027–28 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66–67 (1979) (prohibition on
sale of eagle feathers held not a taking)).
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conclusion that even if an appropriation of realty is a per se taking, a per se
rule should not apply to appropriations of personal property. 93
The Supreme Court rejected this reading of Lucas, asserting that
regulatory restrictions on property use are distinguishable from
appropriations. Regardless of what Lucas had to say about applying a per
se rule to personal property in the regulatory takings context, the Court
contended, without citation, “people still do not expect their property, real
or personal, to be actually occupied or taken away.” 94
This conclusion is problematic on multiple counts: it is correct that
regulatory restrictions on property use and appropriations of property
represent distinct types of government actions. But there is no reason to
think the distinction should matter for the purpose of deciding whether per
se analysis extends to personal property. Just as it traditionally exercises a
“high degree of control over commercial dealings” in personal property in
the regulatory context,95 the government also commonly seizes commercial
personal property for a variety of public purposes, as demonstrated by the
examples cited above. 96 This parallelism suggests that an across-the-board
exception from per se analysis for personal property is appropriate.
In Lucas Justice Scalia justified the per se rule he announced by
observing “that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner’s
point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.” 97 If these two
types of takings are equivalent, recognizing an equivalent personal
property exception for both types of takings makes perfect sense. The
Court’s observation that people “do not expect” either their real or personal
property to be seized is simply judicial ipse dixit. Some may agree; but
others will not. There is nothing in the Constitution that privileges a
judge’s assessment of people’s expectations over those of the people’s
elected representatives in this context.98

93. Horne v. USDA, 750 F.3d 1128, 1139–40 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1039
(2015), and rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). The Ninth Circuit also discussed Loretto v. Manhattan
CATV Teleprompter, 458 U.S. 419 (1982), and concluded that the per se rule for permanent
physical occupations discussed in that case was exclusively focused on land. Horne, 750 F.3d at
1140.
94. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015).
95. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
96. See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text.
97. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017; cf. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005)
(stating that all of the Court’s various takings tests “share a common touchstone;” that is, “[e]ach
aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain”).
98. The same objection about a free-wheeling judiciary can be made in relation to the Court’s
statement in Lucas that, as a result of the State’s traditionally high degree of control over
commercial transactions, an owner of personal property (at least if it is used for sale or
manufacture for sale) “ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render
his property economically worthless.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28. But the analysis in Lucas
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The Court also observed that, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, it recognized a “longstanding
distinction” between regulatory takings and physical takings, suggesting
that this statement supported the conclusion that the personal property
exception to the Lucas per se regulatory takings rule should not apply to
appropriations of personal property. 99 But the Court’s reliance on this
passage from Tahoe-Sierra was unwarranted. In Tahoe-Sierra the Court
addressed how to apply the so-called “parcel as a whole” rule to a
development moratorium, and in the cited passage simply observed that the
Court had a “longstanding” practice of applying the parcel rule differently
in regulatory takings cases than in physical takings cases. Nothing in
Tahoe-Sierra addressed or was even relevant to the issue of whether takings
claims involving personal property should be governed by a per se rule.
The Court’s other reasons for applying a per se rule to raisins and
other personal property were hardly more convincing. The Court
maintained that a uniform per se takings rule was supported by the text of
the Takings Clause because it protects “private property” without
distinguishing between personal property and real property. 100 This
interpretation missed the point because there is no dispute that interests in
personal property constitute property within the meaning of the Takings
Clause. The relevant issues are whether government action affecting
personal property effects a taking and according to what standard. The
Supreme Court’s takings cases have articulated diverse tests and standards
for determining whether government action constitutes a “taking.” 101
reasoning had the virtue of leaving policy choices about social and economic regulation largely to
the people’s elected representatives.
99. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2427 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323 (2002)).
100. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2426.
101. The Horne Court largely elided the distinction between “appropriations” and “physical
occupations,” treating them as variations on the generic category of “physical takings.” Horne II,
135 S. Ct. at 2427. But these labels appear to identify distinctive types of government action: an
appropriation involves a seizure, for the benefit of the government or some third property, of their
physical property itself or of title to the property; an occupation involves physical entry onto
property, for example as a result of flooding or trespass. Occupations appear to involve land
exclusively, while appropriations can involve both real and personal property. Other Court
opinions more clearly distinguished between appropriations and physical occupations. See Ark.
Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012) (initially observing that
“[w]hen the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public
purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner,” but then turning to the issue of
whether temporary physical occupations constitute takings (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002))); see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at
537 (“The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation
or physical invasion of private property.”) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court precedents
support the conclusion that temporary appropriations may be subject to a per se rule. See, e.g.,
Kimball Laundry v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1949); United States v. Gen. Motors, 323
U.S. 373, 381–82 (1945). Temporary physical occupations, however, are not subject to a per se
rule. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 518.
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Consistent with this jurisprudence, the Court could have recognized a
different takings standard for alleged takings of personal property than for
alleged takings of real property.
Second, the Court asserted that “history” supported its position,
pointing to such diverse sources as the Magna Carta and the Massachusetts
Bay Colony’s Body of Liberties. 102 But these sources merely show that
personal property deserves protection under the Takings Clause (which no
one disputes), and that government action impairing a personal property
interest can result in a taking (which no one disputes). 103 These venerable
authorities do not speak to the issue of whether takings claims involving
personal property should be evaluated using a per se test. The reason is
obvious: the Supreme Court did not even begin to articulate the distinction
between per se and non-per se takings analysis until the end of the twentieth
century. 104
Thus, the Court’s historical analysis was hopelessly
anachronistic.
Finally, the Court claimed that “precedent” supported its embrace of a
per se rule. It does not. Dictum in one nineteenth-century case cited by the
Court suggests that appropriations of at least certain kinds of personal
property should be the equivalent of appropriations of land. 105 But the
Court’s other authorities merely confirmed that personal property is
protected by the Takings Clause. 106 This ambiguity in the precedents is
again understandable given the fact that the Court had not recognized the
distinction between per se and non-per se analysis at the time of the
decisions.
More importantly, modern cases, decided after recognition of this
distinction, point away from applying a per se test to personal property.

102. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2426.
103. See William Michael Treavor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 837 (1995) (“The liberal end of the clause established
a rule of law barring the federal government from physically taking real or chattel property,
including slaves, without compensation.”).
104. The Court first explicitly articulated a categorical or per se takings test in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). The Court took this step in
response to the New York Court of Appeals’ rejection of Mrs. Loretto’s takings claim based on
the multi-factor Penn Central analysis articulated just four years earlier in the Penn Central case.
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 330–31 (N.Y. 1981)
(evaluating the takings claim based on an inquiry into “the character of the governmental action,
its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations”); see
also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
105. See James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357–58 (1882) (rejecting claim that government
appropriated patent rights).
106. For example, the Horne II Court explained that the Takings Clause was apparently
adopted in response to appropriations of personal property during the Revolutionary War, a
proposition that is surely correct, see 135 S. Ct. at 2426, but that hardly establishes that
appropriations of personal property in general should be governed by a per se takings rule.

2016]

HORNE v. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

679

Thus, in Bennis v. Michigan, 107 the Court rejected a takings challenge based
on the seizure of an automobile pursuant to the Michigan forfeiture law, a
result plainly inconsistent with the notion that government seizure of
personal property is invariably a taking. 108
In Webb’s Fabulous
Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 109 the Court ruled that a government appropriation
of the interest accruing in an interpleader fund was a taking, but reached
this conclusion only after observing that “[n]o police power justification is
offered for the deprivation”—indicating that consideration of the purpose of
an appropriation of personal property can lead to the conclusion that a
seizure is not a taking. 110 This precedent is also inconsistent with a
sweeping per se rule for appropriations of personal property. The Court in
Horne simply ignored both Bennis and Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, even
though they were arguably the recent Court precedent (apart from Lucas)
most directly relevant to the issue before the Court.111
In sum, the new per se rule established in Horne II is disappointing
from many perspectives. The Court’s ruling lacked support from the text of
the Constitution, history, or relevant precedent, and the decision threatens to
upend important government law enforcement functions at all levels of the
federal system. Yet the Court’s opinion exhibited no awareness of the
potential ramifications of the new per se rule. It is possible that this is a per
se rule for this case only, and the Court will quickly back away from its
ruling on a different set of facts. Equally remarkable was the Court’s
failure to identify possible exceptions or limitations to its new per se rule,
contrary to the Court’s more careful approach in both Loretto and Lucas.
Perhaps the Court intends to devise some future “background principles”
exceptions to temper the apparent severity of its new per se rule. But it is
difficult to discern the likely doctrinal basis for such a move. The nuisance
exception recognized in Lucas, which of course involved the use of land,
was based on the notion that no one can claim a right to use land in a

107. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
108. Id. at 452–53.
109. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
110. Id. at 163.
111. The Court also overlooked the decision in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,
538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003), in which the Court assumed—but only for the sake of argument—that a
requirement that interest earned on bank accounts be transferred to Washington Legal Foundation
was “akin” to a per se taking but then rejected the takings claim on the merits. The defendants
vigorously contested whether a per se takings test should apply in this case. See Brief for
Respondents Legal Foundation of Washington and Its President at 24–33, Brown v. Legal Found.
of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (No. 01–1325), 2002 WL 31387472, at *24–33. Not surprisingly,
given the availability of an alternative basis for rejecting the takings claim, the Brown Court
studiously avoided resolving whether a per se theory governed this alleged appropriation of
personal property. In Horne, a mere twelve years later, the Court cavalierly treated the application
of a per se test to personal property as almost a foregone conclusion.
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fashion that unreasonably interferes with others’ use of their land. 112 It does
not seem likely that this important but relatively specific qualification on
property rights in land can be transferred to personal property. The Court
may eventually find some way to craft needed exceptions to its per se rule,
but it is hard to see how the Court will pull it off.
In the end it remains somewhat of a mystery why a majority of the
Court felt compelled to adopt an apparently uncompromising per se rule for
government appropriations of personal property, especially in such a quirky
case involving New Deal-era regulation of raisins. While the Court’s
decision makes no explicit reference to the broader implications of its
decision, it seems likely the Court had in mind the potential for government
impairment of more intangible personal property, such as copyrights and
patents. On its face, the new per se rule applies to personal property of any
and all kinds. But the wide variety of contexts in which regulation of
personal property may give rise to takings claims in the future makes it
difficult to predict what problems and questions may arise as litigants
attempt to apply this precedent beyond the realm of raisins.
C. Offsetting Benefits
Third, the Court erred by refusing to permit the Department to try to
show that the economic benefits conferred on the Hornes by the raisin
marketing rules equaled or exceeded the burdens imposed on them by the
rules. A taking is unconstitutional only if it is uncompensated, 113 and a
taking must be compensated only if the claimant can show that she suffered
some economic loss as a result of the taking. If a claimant can demonstrate
no entitlement to just compensation because she suffered no loss, even if it
is undisputed that a taking has occurred, there has been no violation of the
Takings Clause. 114 Absent a viable takings claim, the Hornes were not
entitled to raise the Takings Clause as a defense to the penalties imposed on
them for violating the rules of the raisin marketing program.
The Department contended that the Hornes failed to demonstrate that
they would have suffered any net economic loss under the program,
pointing out that the raisin reserve requirement was designed primarily to
benefit raisin growers by restricting the market supply of raisins, thereby
keeping prices elevated.115 It was well within the realm of possibility that

112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979) (defining a nuisance as “[a]n
intentional invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land”).
113. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987)
(the Takings Clause “does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a
condition on the exercise of that power”).
114. See Brown, 538 U.S. at 240 (rejecting takings claim where claimants suffered no net loss
as a resulting of challenged government action).
115. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2419, 2431 (2015).
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the positive effects of the marketing order on the prices the Hornes received
from selling non-reserve raisins would have exceeded the adverse economic
effects of complying with the reserve requirement. Because the Hornes had
not demonstrated that they would have suffered a net adverse economic
effect, the government contended that the program did not threaten them
with a taking without compensation.
Justice Breyer, in dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan,
found this argument compelling. Invoking the traditional rule concerning
offsetting benefits, he observed that the amount of compensation due under
the Takings Clause generally must be calculated by subtracting from the
compensation due any offsetting benefits conferred by the government
action that caused the taking. 116 A classic application of this rule is when
the government takes a portion of a parcel of land for a right-of-way for a
road, and the amount due for the right-of-way is reduced by the increase in
the value of the remaining land due to the enhanced access provided by the
new road. 117 While conceding that this rule has been commonly applied in
the context of direct condemnations, Justice Breyer maintained that,
logically, the same rule should apply in inverse condemnation actions. 118
Recognizing that the lower courts had yet to come to grips with this issue,
he argued for a remand to consider whether any compensation would have
been due had the Hornes complied with the regulations. 119
The Court majority disagreed. Without disputing the general principle
of offsetting benefits, Chief Justice Roberts maintained that the rule did not
apply in the context of regulatory benefits: “Cases of that sort [involving
offsetting benefits] can raise complicated questions involving the exercise
of the eminent domain power, but they do not create a generally applicable
exception to the usual compensation rule, based on asserted regulatory
benefits of the sort at issue here.” 120 This conclusion, offered without any
supporting analysis, seems indefensible.
The doctrine of inverse
condemnation (including but not limited to regulatory takings) is built on
the understanding that a unified set of principles govern takings law, and
that the basic rules governing takings cases are the same regardless of
whether the government initiates a condemnation action or a court finds a
taking in an inverse condemnation action initiated by a property owner.
This equivalence is, after all, at the foundation of the Court’s landmark
ruling in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Los
116. Id. at 2434 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (quoting Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897)) (“[W]hen part only of a parcel
of land is taken for a highway, the value of that part is not the sole measure of the compensation or
damages to be paid to the owner; but the incidental injury or benefit to the part not taken is also to
be considered.”).
118. Id. at 2435.
119. Id. at 2436.
120. Id. at 2432 (majority opinion).
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Angeles, 121 which resolved that the default remedy for a regulatory taking is
an award of just compensation.122 As the First English Court stated,
“While the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn
property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire doctrine
of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may
occur without such formal proceedings.” 123 Given the essential equivalence
of direct condemnations and inverse condemnations, there is no logical
reason to suppose that off-setting benefits should matter in condemnation
cases and not in inverse condemnation cases. Tellingly, the Chief Justice
cited no precedent supporting his position, and there does not appear to be
any. 124
The Chief Justice also maintained that, “in any event,” this case
provided “no occasion” to resolve how the offsetting benefits rule should
apply in an inverse condemnation case because “[t]he Government has
already calculated the amount of just compensation in this case, when it
fined the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins.” 125 This alternative
argument was plainly mistaken as well.
The applicable regulations state that if a handler fails to comply with
the reserve requirement, the handler “shall compensate the [RAC] for the
amount of the loss resulting from his failure to so deliver.”126 In other
words, if a handler fails to deliver some quantity of raisins to the RAC, the
regulations require the handler to pay the dollar equivalent of the raisins
improperly withheld; this calculation ensures that the handler is not unjustly
enriched by a violation of the rules, and the RAC is made whole for the
violation. There is no reason to think that the amount of this administrative
penalty, designed to secure compliance with the marketing program, is
necessarily the measure of the “just compensation” that could be claimed by
a handler under the Takings Clause if he had complied with the rules and
could assert a viable takings claim. The penalty and the potential just
compensation award serve different purposes, are calculated differently, and
there is no reason to think they will be the same figure. For the reasons just
discussed, 127 there is a substantial argument that the amount due in
compensation under the Takings Clause would have to be discounted, if not
erased, to take account of any offsetting benefits. By pointing to the
government’s calculation of the penalty amount as if it would self-evidently
121. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
122. Id. at 314–22.
123. Id. at 316.
124. See Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2436 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I [am not] aware of any
precedent that would distinguish between how the Baumann doctrine applies to the reserve
requirement itself and how it applies to other types of partial takings.”).
125. Id. at 2433.
126. 7 C.F.R. § 989.166(d) (1978).
127. See supra notes 116–119 and accompanying text.
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be equivalent to a just compensation award under the Takings Clause, the
Horne II majority plainly erred.
D. Failure to Apply the Nollan/Dolan Analysis
Fourth, the Court also stumbled by failing to recognize—assuming the
Hornes were otherwise entitled to present a takings argument in opposition
to the penalties—that their takings argument should have been evaluated
under the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests articulated in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 128 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.129
If the Court had applied these standards, it likely would have concluded,
like the Ninth Circuit, that the takings argument failed on the merits,
meaning that the penalties should have been upheld.
To understand why the Court missed this issue it is necessary to
unpack the case a bit further. The third question in the petition for certiorari
read as follows: “Whether a governmental mandate to relinquish specific,
identifiable property as a ‘condition’ on permission to engage in commerce
effects a per se taking.” 130 The presence of this question in the petition for
certiorari is baffling because it does not refer either to an argument the
government presented to the Ninth Circuit following the remand in Horne
I, 131 or to a position embraced by the Ninth Circuit on remand. As
discussed above, the Ninth Circuit in 2011 originally ruled that the Hornes
were barred from making a takings claim because they had entered the
raisin business voluntarily, but in response to the Hornes’ petition for
rehearing the Ninth Circuit rescinded its ruling on that issue. 132
Given this course of proceedings, the Supreme Court had no business
addressing the third issue presented in the petition for certiorari in Horne II.
A party who has succeeded in persuading a lower court to withdraw a ruling
obviously cannot legitimately file a petition for certiorari asking the
Supreme Court to review the merits of the ruling the lower court has
abandoned. 133 In their petition for certiorari in Horne II, 134 the Hornes
presented an issue that, at that late stage of the case, was no longer a
128. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
129. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
130. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015) (No. 14–275), 2014
WL 4404781, at *i.
131. See generally Supplemental Brief for Appellee, supra note 67.
132. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
133. “Ordinarily,” the Supreme Court “do[es] not decide in the first instance issues not
decided below.” Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1430 (2012) (quoting Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n. v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 470 (1999)). It logically follows from this basic principle
governing the Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction that if a lower court explicitly decides not to
address an issue, that issue is not appropriate for review in the Supreme Court. This is especially
true in a case like Horne II where the petitioner succeeded in persuading the court below to
rescind its opinion addressing the issue.
134. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 130.
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legitimate part of the case. Unfortunately, in its opposition to the petition,
the Department of Agriculture raised no objection to the petitioners’ effort
to interject the issue.135 As a result, when the Court granted the petition for
certiorari, it granted the petition in toto, without excluding the third issue
from consideration. 136 At the merits stage, the Department found itself in
the unenviable position of defending an argument the Ninth Circuit had
abandoned.
The Court answered the third question in the Hornes’ petition in the
affirmative, despite the fact that its precedents unambiguously supported a
negative answer. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 137 and Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 138 the Court ruled that when the government grants
permission to engage in particular activity on the condition that a person
surrender some property interest, the forced exaction of the property may or
may not be a taking depending on the circumstances. An exaction is a
taking if there is no nexus between the government’s regulatory objectives
and the purpose of the exaction,139 or if the burden imposed by the exaction
is not roughly proportional to the public harms threatened by the regulated
activity. 140 On the other hand, an exaction is not a taking if the “essential
nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests are satisfied.
Thus, in Horne II, applying the Nollan/Dolan analysis, the answer to
the takings question—whether “a governmental mandate to relinquish a
specific, identifiable property” as a condition of obtaining permission to
engage in a particular business effects taking—should have been: “It
depends.” Consequently, the correct answer to the question presented in the
petition—whether such a mandate results in a per se taking, that is, whether
it invariably results in a taking—should have been “no.” Unfortunately, the
Court’s answer to the question in the petition was “yes.”141 As discussed
below, it is hard to know how seriously to take the Court’s answer.
The Department of Agriculture should have addressed the third
question in the petition by arguing that a per se takings test did not apply
(and therefore the answer to the question posed in the petition was “no”),
that (at most) 142 the Hornes were entitled to the benefit of the relatively
135. See generally Brief for Respondent, supra note 57.
136. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015). The other two issues raised in the petition for
certiorari—whether a per se rule governs a takings claim based on an alleged governmental
seizure of an interest in personal property, and whether application of a per se rule was barred by
the fact that the Hornes were entitled to the net proceeds from the RAC’s sale of reserve raisins—
were addressed by the Ninth Circuit and were properly raised by the petition for certiorari.
137. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
138. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
139. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
140. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
141. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2430 (2015).
142. We suggest “at most” because application of the Nollan/Dolan analysis would have been
appropriate only if a direct appropriation of raisins, outside of the context of the raisin marketing
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stringent Nollan/Dolan standards, and that the Department should have
prevailed under those standards, as the Ninth Circuit had concluded
below. 143 Instead, the Department’s primary argument on the merits,
relying on the Court’s 1984 decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 144
was that the marketing program, far from effecting a per se taking, worked
no taking at all as a matter of law. Monsanto rejected a takings claim based
on a regulation requiring pesticide manufacturers to hand over their trade
secrets on health and safety issues as a condition of receiving an EPA
license to sell pesticides. The Monsanto Court ruled that “a voluntary”
exchange of property interests in trade secrets “for the economic advantages
of a registration can hardly be called a taking.” 145 In Horne II the
Department argued that just as there was no taking in requiring Monsanto to
turn over trade secret data to the government as a condition of obtaining an
EPA license, there was no taking in requiring the Hornes to turn over a
portion of their raisin crop as a condition of gaining permission to sell their
raisins.
The Supreme Court made short work of this argument, principally
because the Court’s intervening Nollan decision had already reduced the
Monsanto precedent to the size of a pea. Monsanto, Nollan, and Dolan all
involved the same basic fact pattern: the government granted an
authorization (a license to use pesticides in Monsanto and permission to
develop land in Nollan and Dolan), in exchange for citizens giving up some
property interest to the government (trade secrets in Monsanto and
easements in land in the other cases). In Nollan, decided three years after
Monsanto, the California Coastal Commission defended against the takings
claim by invoking Monsanto, arguing that exacting an easement as a
condition of a development permit was the equivalent of exacting trade
secrets as a condition of an EPA license. The Nollan Court rejected this
argument, distinguishing Monsanto on the ground that, unlike the right to
sell pesticides, “the right to build on one’s own property—even though its
exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements—cannot

program, would necessarily have resulted in a taking. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831–34 (justifying
the demanding “essential nexus” standard on the premise that there was “no doubt” a direct
mandate to the Nollans to allow the public to pass across their beach would have been a taking);
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 375 (applying the same reasoning to justify applying “rough proportionality”
test to an exaction involving a bike path and greenway). For the reason discussed above, see
supra notes 86–141 and accompanying text, we do not think that premise necessarily applies in
this case, because a per se rule should not be applied to resolve a takings claim based on a
freestanding government appropriation of personal property. However, even if the premise were
correct, the Court still should have allowed the Department to attempt to defend its regulations
under the Nollan/Dolan standards, rather than resolving the issue by fiat using a per se rule.
143. Horne v. USDA, 750 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1039
(2015), and rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
144. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
145. Id.
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remotely be described as a ‘governmental benefit.’”146 As a result, the
Court said, “the announcement that the application for (or granting of) the
permit will entail the yielding of a property interest cannot be regarded as
establishing the voluntary ‘exchange,’ that we found to have occurred in
Monsanto.” 147 Following Nollan (and then Dolan), the Monsanto precedent
became little more than a legal oddity, and the essential nexus and rough
proportionality tests represented the new, relatively more exacting standards
for evaluating takings challenges to government exactions.
In Horne II, in response to the Department’s attempt to defeat the
takings claim by invoking Monsanto, the Court rejected the argument,
applying the narrow reading of Monsanto it previously adopted in Nollan.
Moreover, the Horne II Court placed a new gloss on Monsanto, arguably
narrowing the significance of that precedent still further. Monsanto, the
Horne Court explained, involved a voluntary exchange of property interests
for a “valuable Government benefit . . .—a license to sell dangerous
chemicals.” 148 By contrast, the alleged taking in Horne could not
“reasonably be characterized as part of a similar voluntary exchange.” 149
Just as the use of land at issue in Nollan and Dolan was not a government
benefit “on the same order as a permit to sell hazardous chemicals,” Horne
II reasoned, “[s]elling produce . . . is similarly not a special governmental
benefit that the Government may hold hostage to be ransomed by the
waiver of constitutional protection.” 150 In addition, the Court quipped,
“Raisins are not a dangerous pesticide; they are a healthy snack.” 151 By
emphasizing that Monsanto involved not only the grant of a benefit, but the
benefit of selling a “dangerous” product, Horne II arguably narrowed the
circumstances in which Monsanto will serve as a useful precedent in the
future. 152
The glaring gap in the Court’s reasoning in Horne II was that, if
Monsanto was not the controlling precedent and did not defeat the takings
146. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.2.
147. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007 (1984)).
148. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2430 (2015).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2430–31.
151. Id. at 2431.
152. In addition, in light of the Court’s effort in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.,
133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013), to position the Court’s exactions cases within the larger context of
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, it is difficult to know whether there is anything left of
Monsanto at all. Unconstitutional conditions, as generally understood, proscribe the denial of a
government “benefit” because a citizen refused to give up a constitutional right. See Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Given this basic understanding of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, it is far from clear why it matters that the license at issue in Monsanto could
be characterized as a “benefit.” But cf. John Echeverria, The Costs of Koontz, 39 VT. L. REV. 573
(2015) (contending that, contrary to the Court’s apparent reasoning in Koontz, Nollan and Dolan
are based on a different conception of unconstitutional conditions than that involved in cases
involving First Amendment issues).
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claim (a conclusion that was hard to dispute, at least after Nollan), it did not
logically follow that a per se takings rule applied. In Nollan the Court
rejected the government’s position, based on Monsanto, that it could defeat
a takings claim by treating the grant of an easement as a voluntary exchange
for a land use permit. But the Nollan Court said the government could still
defeat the takings claim by showing an essential nexus between the
government’s regulatory purposes and the purpose of the easement.
Following the reasoning of Nollan, which the Court purported to apply in
Horne II, if selling raisins is not a “privilege” in the same sense that
developing land is not a privilege, that did not mean that the Hornes could
claim the benefit of a per se rule. At most it meant only that in order to
defeat the takings claim, the Department would have to try to defend the
reserve requirement under the Nollan and Dolan standards. The Ninth
Circuit already had concluded that Nollan and Dolan applied in this case,
and that the reserve requirement did not result in a taking under those
standards. 153 But the Supreme Court simply ignored the Ninth Circuit’s
application of the Nolan/Dolan standards, applying a per se takings test
instead.
The analysis in Horne II can be read to add a new layer of complexity
to exactions doctrine. In some narrow category of cases governed by
Monsanto, involving dangerous pesticides, for example, the government
can defeat a takings claim, without having to demonstrate compliance with
the Nollan/Dolan standards, by demonstrating that the government’s grant
of regulatory permission represents the conferral of a “privilege.” In that
circumstance, the government can legitimately exact some property interest
in voluntary exchange for the conferral of the privilege without offending
the Takings Clause. In other cases, involving permits for the use of land,
for example, the government can also impose exactions without triggering
the Takings Clause, but only if it can satisfy the Nollan/Dolan standards.
Finally, Horne II suggests that there might be a third category of
exactions—involving neither the granting of a privilege nor the granting of
permission to use land—where the demand for an exaction as a condition of
allowing some activity, such as selling some non-dangerous product (like
raisins), can be challenged directly as a per se taking without reference to
the Nollan/Dolan standards.
It seems implausible, given the importance the Court has attached to
rights in land in other takings cases,154 that the Court intends to grant the
government more latitude under the Takings Clause in imposing conditions

153. Horne v. USDA, 750 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1039
(2015), and rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
154. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992) (referring, in the context
of land use regulation, to “the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become
part of our constitutional culture”).
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on the use of land than in imposing conditions on the conduct of ordinary
business affairs, such as the sale of raisins. Yet that is the implication of the
new outline of exactions doctrine after Horne II sketched out above.
Perhaps the Court simply goofed in Horne II by failing to recognize that the
government should at least have been allowed to try to defeat the takings
challenge based on Nollan and Dolan. The Department of Agriculture’s
failure to vigorously defend the Ninth Circuit’s use of the Nollan/Dolan
tests helps explain this error in Horne II. So also the too-clever-by-half
advocacy by the Hornes’ Supreme Court counsel in framing the petition for
certiorari helps explain how the Court managed to go so far astray. 155
One hint that the Court itself may not take its ruling on this issue very
seriously is the carefully worded response to the third question in the
petition: “The answer,” the Court said, “at least in this case, is yes.” 156
Perhaps the underscored language indicates that its new per se rule may
apply in the Horne case only, much like its view of the Equal Protection
Clause in Bush v. Gore, which was good for only that day. 157
III. HORNE’S REAFFIRMATION OF STATE SOVEREIGN OWNERSHIP OF
WILDLIFE
Notwithstanding the Court’s advancement of the libertarian property
rights agenda in the above rulings in Horne II, the case contains a
significant, surprising silver lining for government defendants—a ringing
reaffirmation of the doctrine of sovereign public ownership of wildlife.158

155. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
156. 135 S. Ct. at 2430 (emphasis added).
157. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (“Our consideration is limited to the present
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities.”).
158. Another silver lining for the government side in Horne II was the Court’s implicit
endorsement of an expansive view of the “public use” requirement of the Takings Clause. Since
the Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), there has been
considerable scholarly debate about whether the Kelo Court correctly ruled that a seizure of
private property for transfer to another private party to achieve some public purpose can satisfy
the public use requirement. See generally ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF
NEW LONDON & THE LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2015). In Horne II the Court implicitly
reaffirmed Kelo’s broad reading of the public use requirement by ruling that the raisin marketing
program, which authorizes government transfers of raisins from growers to various other private
parties, constituted a taking “for public use.” Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2015). Justice
Thomas, in a concurring opinion, underscored the significance of Horne II for the public use
debate by observing that the premise that the raisin marketing program served a public use was
inconsistent with his view, expressed in his dissenting opinion in Kelo, that the public use
requirement should be interpreted to mean that “the government may take property only if it
actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the property.” Id. at 2433 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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A. Reaffirmation of the Sovereign Ownership Doctrine
The 1929 decision in Leonard & Leonard v. Earle, 159 presented a
conundrum for the Court in Horne II. In that nearly ninety-year-old case
the Supreme Court ruled that there was no taking when Maryland required
oysters packers, as a condition of receiving a business license, to hand over
a portion of their emptied oyster shells to the state for use as a substrate to
propagate more Chesapeake Bay oysters. 160 Like the reserve raisin
requirement in Horne, this condition represented a direct seizure of private
property from individual owners. Also as in Horne, the seizure aimed to
benefit members of the regulated industry. Thus, Leonard was on all fours
with the Horne case and appeared to be a strong and somewhat startling
precedent in support of the government. 161
The Court could have avoided Leonard’s no taking rule by explaining
that Leonard, like Monsanto, had been superseded by the Court’s later
decisions in Nollan and Dolan. Like Nollan and Dolan, Leonard concerned
whether the government could, as a condition of offering some benefit (a
license to pack oysters or local land use permission), require the property
owner to hand over some property (empty oyster shells or a public
easement) to the government. The Court might have reasoned that, in light
of Nollan and Dolan, the government could no longer justify an exaction of
oyster shells as a voluntary exchange for the benefit of receiving a license
to engage in oyster packing. Employing this approach, the Court would
have said that such an exaction could be defended against a takings claim
only if the government could show that the exaction met the essential nexus
and rough proportionality requirements. The problem with that line of
argument, from the Hornes’ standpoint, is that it might have led to the
conclusion that, just as the Ninth Circuit had ruled, the Hornes had never
been threatened with a taking because the reserve requirement satisfied the
Nollan/Dolan standards. Accordingly, from a strategic standpoint, it is
understandable that the Hornes did not point the Court in that direction, and
the Court did not find that path on its own.
But the petitioners were in an equally difficult quandary if they
accepted Leonard as binding precedent and ignored Nollan and Dolan. On
159. 279 U.S. 392 (1929).
160. Id. at 396.
161. The Department of Agriculture cited the Leonard case only once in its merits brief, see
Brief for Respondent, supra note 57, at 26, and did not discuss the decision at any length or
highlight its significance for the Horne case. Thus, it came as something of a surprise during the
oral argument when Justices Sotomayor and Kagan closely questioned counsel for both sides
about the Leonard case. See Transcript of Oral Argument supra note 77, at 7–9,47–49. Justice
Alito asked why the Department had not highlighted the case more prominently in its brief. Id. at
46 (“I take it that you don’t think that the Leonard case has a very important bearing on this case
because you cite it one time in your brief, it’s a passing reference, on the issue of fungible
goods.”).
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its face, Leonard supported applying the voluntary exchange analysis
followed in Monsanto outside the domain of dangerous pesticides. The
oysters at issue in Leonard were plainly benign, just as benign as the raisins
in Horne. So, given the Court’s clear rejection of the oyster packers’
takings claim, Leonard suggested that the Court should reject the takings
argument in Horne as well. In other words, in order to avoid the logical
conclusion that Leonard required rejection of the Hornes’ takings claim, the
petitioners had to distinguish Leonard. Enter the doctrine of sovereign
public ownership of wildlife.
Chief Justice Roberts, embracing the Hornes’ argument, thought that
the doctrine of sovereign ownership of wildlife made the Leonard decision
“readily distinguishable” from the Horne case. 162 The oyster exaction was
not an unconstitutional taking because the oysters, “unlike raisins,” were
state-owned ferae naturae. 163 The Chief Justice quoted from the Maryland
court’s decision in Leonard to the effect that “[n]o individual ha[d] any
property rights in them other than such as the state may permit him to
acquire.” 164 Thus, “[t]he oyster packers did not simply seek to sell their
property, they sought to appropriate the State’s.” 165 Consequently, the real
issue in Leonard, the Court concluded, was not just compensation for the
packers, but “reasonable and fair compensation” to the state for the harvest
of publicly owned oysters. 166
Chief Justice Roberts saw the distinction between oysters and raisins
quite clearly: “Raisins are not like oysters: they are private property—the
fruit of the growers’ labor—not ‘public things subject to the absolute
control of the state.’” 167 Thus, while the public character of the oysters
foreclosed Leonard’s taking claim in the case of the oyster exaction, the
labor that the Hornes invested in their raisin crop apparently warranted
compensation for that exaction.
Ironically, the enduring significance of Horne II may lie not so much
in its uncertain expansion of the per se takings rule to personality as in the
contrast the Court drew between private property—raisins—and public
property, like oysters. The Court’s recognition of the public character of
wildlife was a ringing endorsement of the state ownership doctrine, which

162. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2431.
163. Id.; see also id. (observing that “‘the [oyster] packers did ‘not deny the power of the State
to declare their business a privilege,’ and the power of the State to impose a ‘privilege tax’ was
‘not questioned by counsel.’” (quoting Leonard, 279 U.S. at 396)).
164. Id. (quoting Leonard v. Earle, 155 Md. 252, 258, 141 A.714, 716 (1928)).
165. Id.
166. Id. (noting that “the Maryland Court of Appeals saw the issue as a question of ‘a
reasonable and fair compensation’ from the packers to ‘the state, as owner of the oysters.’”
(quoting Leonard, 155 Md. at 259, 141 A. at 717)).
167. Id. (quoting the Maryland Court of Appeals decision in Leonard, 158 Md. at 258, 141 A.
at 716).
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should serve to insulate regulations protecting wildlife from takings claims
in the future.
B. The Implications of Reaffirming Sovereign Ownership
Sovereign ownership of wildlife, a doctrine inherited from English
law, 168 has long been recognized in American jurisprudence. 169 During the
post-Civil War era, many states invoked the doctrine in an effort to curb the
market hunting that was extirpating bird species like the passenger
pigeon. 170 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld those efforts resoundingly in its
1896 decision of Geer v. Connecticut, 171 which approved a state law
forbidding the post-season out-of-state transport of game legally
harvested—on the ground that the state owned the wild game, and thus had
plenary authority to establish harvest and post-harvest regulations. 172
Today, virtually all states claim sovereign ownership of wildlife held in
trust for the public. 173
The state wildlife ownership doctrine is in fact about as settled a
principle as exists in natural resources law. 174 Its origins lie in the English
Crown’s claim of ownership of wildlife, 175 and the American states
succeeded to the Crown’s prerogatives after the Revolution. 176 However,
unlike in feudal England, the states initially adopted a freewheeling rule of
capture, providing for subsistence hunters. 177 In the nineteenth century,
168. See infra notes 174–176 and accompanying text. See generally MICHAEL J. BEAN &
MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 10–11 (3d ed. 1997)
(explaining the English origins of wildlife law); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE & DALE D. GOBLE,
WILDLIFE LAW: A PRIMER 25 (2009).
169. See FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 168, at 25 (“By the end of the nineteenth century,
ownership trust language . . . regularly appeared in American judicial rulings.”).
170. F. Wayne King, The Wildlife Trade, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 253–54 (Howard
Brokaw ed., 1978) (discussing the inadequacy of individual state laws to curb the hunting and
extinction of pigeons and other animals).
171. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
172. Id. at 534 (wildlife trust implies a legislative duty “to enact such laws as will best
preserve the subject of the trust and secure its beneficial use in the future to the people of the
State”).
173. See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L.
REV. 1437, 1488–1504 (listing forty-seven state claims of sovereign ownership or claims of
wildlife trust).
174. See BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 168, at 10–11 (discussing the development of the
state ownership doctrine).
175. See FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 168, at 22 (“The legal rule in medieval England
was that game species were owned by the Crown, not by landowners . . . .”).
176. See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 367, 416 (1842) (“And when the people
of New Jersey took possession of the reins of government, and took into their own hands the
powers of sovereignty, the prerogatives and regalities which before belonged either to the crown
or the parliament, became immediately and rightfully vested in the state.”).
177. Epitomizing the rule of capture is the famous case of Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 182,
2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), which has introduced generations of students to their study
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most states—many relying on the sovereign ownership doctrine—turned to
controlling harvests to preserve game from extirpation. 178 These sovereign
ownership claims were universally upheld by state courts,179 and, as
discussed, by the Supreme Court in Geer v. Connecticut. 180
Sovereign ownership of wildlife means that challenges to state wildlife
regulations under the Takings Clause will generally fail.181 The state
ownership principle is the quintessential “background principle” of state
property law that serves to insulate state regulation from successful takings
claims. 182 The doctrine provides insulation against takings claims because
the public nature of wildlife means that no landowner can claim a property
interest sufficient to trigger the Constitution’s proscription against taking
private property for public use without paying just compensation. 183 The
Supreme Court established the background principles defense a quarter
century ago as an “antecedent inquiry” in takings cases.184 Numerous
of property law. The rule of capture was strong enough in early America to override the
landowner’s right to exclude. See, e.g., Mc’Conico v. Singleton, 2 Mill Const. 244, 246, 9 S.C.L.
(1 Mill) 244 (S.C. Const. App. 1818) (upholding a hunter’s right to enter privately owned
unenclosed lands to search for and harvest wild game).
178. The evolution of state regulation of wildlife under the state ownership doctrine is told by
JOHN F. REIGER, AMERICAN SPORTSMAN AND THE ORIGINS OF CONSERVATION (3d ed. 2001).
See also FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note 168, at 26–27; George Cameron Coggins, Wildlife and
the Constitution: The Walls Come Tumbling Down, 55 WASH. L. REV. 295, 305 (1980).
179. See, e.g., Magner v. People, 97 Ill. 320, 336 (1881) (holding that a game restriction
statute does not violate the commerce clause of the constitution); Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409, 417
(1868) (upholding a state’s ability to regulate fish because “fish are ferae naturae, and as far as
any right of property in them can exist, it is in the public, or is common to all”); Nickerson v.
Brackett, 10 Mass. (1 Tyng) 212, 216 (1813) (“[T]he privilege of fishing . . . [is] liable to be
regulated, restrained and limited by the legislature.”); Phelps v. Racey, 60 N.Y. 10, 14 (1875)
(explaining that game preservation can be determined by the legislatures of the states and the court
does not review this discretion).
180. 161 U.S. 519, 535 (1896). See Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 173, at 1459–60.
181. See, e.g., Alford v. Finch, 155 So.2d 790, 795 (Fla. 1963) (declining to enforce state
regulation limiting hunting on private land); Allen v. McClellan, 405 P.2d 405, 407–08 (N.M.
1965) (same).
182. See John D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights: Wildlife
Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 338 (2003) (observing that wildlife
regulations “have proven essentially noncompensable under the Takings Clause”).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. V. State ownership of wildlife also equips the states with the
authority, and perhaps the duty, to collect damages for injuries to wildlife, and should authorize
the public to challenge state failure to carry out its wildlife trust duties. See Echeverria & Lurman,
supra note 182, at 342, 354–56.
184. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). The Lucas decision
established a categorical per se takings principle for regulations wiping out all economic value,
but this principle did not apply to regulations that merely codified background principles of
property and nuisance law. Id. at 1029. Although Lucas concerned a regulation apparently
producing such an economic wipeout, courts in other takings contexts have also used the
background principles defense. See, e.g., Nw. La. Fish & Game Comm’n v. United States, 574
F.3d 1386, 1392–93 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (ruling that federal navigational servitude barred physical
takings claim based on government-caused flooding); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 60 Fed. Cl. 230, 235 (2004), vacated on other grounds, 457 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
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ensuing lower court decisions have applied the background principles
defense. 185
Notwithstanding the venerable pedigree of the sovereign ownership
doctrine, a series of Supreme Court decisions over the course of the
twentieth century had cast something of a cloud over the doctrine. For
example, in Missouri v. Holland, 186 the Court rejected the argument that the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act invaded the states’ exclusive authority to
manage wildlife, commenting that to attack the constitutionality of the Act
based on sovereign ownership of wildlife was “to lean upon a slender
reed.” 187 In Toomer v. Witsell, 188 the Court struck down a South Carolina
statute imposing exorbitant fees on nonresident fishermen as inconsistent
with the Privileges and Immunities Clause.189 The Toomer Court rejected
the state’s defense based on sovereign ownership, observing that “[t]he
whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State
have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important
resource.” 190 And, in 1979, in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 191 which involved a
Commerce Clause challenge to a statute virtually identical to the statute at
issue in Geer, the Court partially overruled Geer, and in the process
described the sovereign ownership doctrine as “19th-century legal
fiction.” 192
Taken together, these statements from the Supreme Court seemed to
relegate the public ownership doctrine to the dustbin of history. But as
some courts 193 and commentators 194 have recognized, the Court’s rhetoric

aff’d, 552 U.S. 130 (2008) (recognizing that background principles of nuisance and property law
can bar physical takings claim based on environmental remediation activities).
185. Background principles of property would include but are not limited to sovereign
ownership of wildlife. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The
Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321,
341–64 (2005) (collecting cases which applied background principles to defeat takings claims).
186. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
187. Id. at 434.
188. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
189. Id. at 406–07.
190. Id. at 402 (citing ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 197–
202 (1922)).
191. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
192. Id. at 335–36.
193. See, e.g., Shepherd v. State, 897 P.2d 33, 40–41 (Alaska 1995) (ruling that the state
ownership doctrine retains vitality absent a “conflict with paramount federal interests”) (citing
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 385–86 (1978)); State v. Fertterer, 841
P.2d 467, 470 (Mont. 1992) (affirming the convictions of two individuals for killing game without
a license, rejecting the argument that Hughes “effectively preclude[d]” the state from relying on
its ownership of wild game to regulate hunting).
194. See Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect Where
the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-o-Links, and Other Things That Go Bump in the Night, 85
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was more than the case law justified. First, all the cases discussed above
involved conflicts between federal law and state law that could have been
resolved on Supremacy Clause grounds without implicating the public
ownership doctrine. Second, within our constitutional structure, the United
States Supreme Court lacks the authority to review and jettison substantive
state law rules with which the justices disagree.195 In short, the Supreme
Court’s unreflective apparent dismissal of sovereign ownership seemed
unnecessary dicta and implausible. As Oliver Houck pithily observed, the
Supreme Court “did not, and could not, overrule principles dating back to
Roman law that wild animals are the common property of the citizen of a
state.” 196 Still, the Court’s statement that state ownership was a “legal
fiction” called the doctrine’s viability into question. However, the states
have resoundingly (and nearly unanimously) either ignored or rejected the
apparent demise of the state ownership doctrine.197
Horne II made clear that, at least in the context of takings clause
analysis, the epithet “legal fiction” had to do only with the states’ attempt to
assert a property claim against federal sovereign power. That was the socalled “fiction” that the Court disregarded in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 198 not
state claims that they could regulate the taking of wildlife and its habitat
without serious private rights challenges. State ownership of wildlife
was—and always had been—a short-hand (but accurate) way of describing
the state’s plenary control over the taking and conservation of wildlife, so
long as it respected federal prerogatives. Horne II was an emphatic
affirmation of state sovereign authority to control the private taking of
wildlife.
The implications of the Horne II Court’s endorsement of the state
ownership of wildlife doctrine are far-reaching. First, the decision
implicitly recognized the longstanding understanding that states may define
wildlife as public property, as they almost universally have done. 199
Consequently, states may control the acquisition of private rights in

IOWA L. REV. 849 (2000); Anna R. C. Caspersen, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Impossibility
of “Takings” by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 357 (1996).
195. See, e.g., G. Merle Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 MICH. L.
REV. 17, 25–26 (1947) (discussing the limitations of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction as it applies
to state laws).
196. Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does That Say
About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute “Takings”?, 80 IOWA
L. REV. 297, 311 n.77 (1995).
197. At least forty-seven states have endorsed state sovereign ownership of wildlife. See
supra note 173.
198. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
199. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529–30 (1896); FREYFOGLE & GOBLE, supra note
168, at 26–27; Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 173, at 1451–65, 1488–504.
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wildlife, 200 unless preempted or interfering with the federal commerce
clause. 201 Second, Horne II clarified that state regulation of wildlife owned
by states in a sovereign capacity cannot give rise to viable takings clause
claims. 202 Third, although the Leonard case involved harvest regulations,
the logic of the Horne II Court’s endorsement of the sovereign ownership
doctrine extends to takings claims based on restrictions on destruction or
modification of habitat upon which species depend for their survival 203—
the chief cause of species jeopardy in the United States today. 204
Consequently, the public ownership doctrine may serve as a powerful
defense to takings claims based on the federal Endangered Species Act or
other similar federal or state laws.
A fourth implication of Horne II’s recognition of state sovereign
ownership concerns the encouragement it signals to states that they may
collect damages from those who injure state wildlife from pollution or
habitat destruction.205 Finally, Horne II may encourage state courts to give
full effect to the trust that sovereign ownership implies by granting the

200. See, e.g., Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 59 (Alaska 1996) (holding that wildlife is the
state’s property); Wright v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 562 S.E.2d 515, 517–18 (Ga. App. 2002) (same);
People v. Zimberg, 33 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Mich. 1948); State v. Hanlon, 82 N.E. 662, 664 (Ohio
1907) (holding that licensing fishing is an appropriate exercise of the state police power).
201. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act); United States v.
Massachusetts, 493 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) (discussing the preemption analysis in terms of
maritime laws); Gutierrez v. Mobil Oil Corp., 798 F. Supp. 1280, 1285–86 (W.D. Tex. 1992)
(holding that “[t]he Clean Air Act does not preempt source-state common law claims against a
stationary source”).
202. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2431.
203. State courts have traditionally interpreted the scope of the doctrine of sovereign
ownership of wildlife to extend to habitat protection. See, e.g., Barrett v. State, 116 N.E. 99, 100
(N.Y. 1917) (ruling that the public ownership doctrine justified not only the protection of beavers
themselves, but of their “dams, houses, homes or abiding places of same” (quoting Laws 1904, c.
674 § 1 (1904)); Columbia Fishermen’s Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 87 P.2d 195, 198–
99 (Or. 1939) (upholding a suit to restrain pollution of the Willamette and Columbia Rivers in
order to protect public fisheries based on the public ownership doctrine, observing that the state’s
authority based on public ownership doctrine “extends not only to the [direct] taking of its fish,
but also over the waters inhabited by the fish,” and that states’ “care of the fish would be of no
avail if it had no power to protect the waters from pollution”).
FOR
BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY,
204. See
The
Extinction
Crisis,
CTR.
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/biodiversity/elements_of_biodiversity/extinction_cri
sis/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2015).
205. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (“Under the public trust
doctrine, the State of Virginia and the United States have the right and the duty to protect and
preserve the public’s interest in natural wildlife resources. Such right does not derive from the
ownership of the resources but from a duty owing to the people.” (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385, 408 (1948))); State Dep’t of Fisheries v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764, 767 (Wash. App. 1980)
(“Representing the people of the state—the owners of the [spawning grounds that were] destroyed
by violation of the statute—the Department of Fisheries thus has a right of action for damages. In
addition, the state, through the Department, has the fiduciary obligation of any trustee to seek
damages for injury to the object of its trust.”).
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citizen beneficiaries standing to challenge judicially state actions that fail to
carry out the trust responsibility. A trust imposed upon the state without a
means of public enforcement would be a chimera.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Horne case was full of surprises. The Court’s interest in twice
deciding a case about the government’s role in raisin marketing was
startling. Perhaps the reason for the Court’s enduring interest in the case
was its belief that raisin growers—producers of a benign “healthy
snack” 206—needed judicial protection from economically irrational
government overreaching, even if the marketing program was aimed at
benefitting the raisin growers themselves.207 The Court obviously thought
this New Deal program was anachronistic, so it effectively scrapped it,
since Congress seemed to lack the will to do so.
Perhaps the Court thought it was simply performing the function of
updating the law, something common law judges have done for centuries.
However, overturning statutes is not quite the same as updating common
law, the former requiring a good deal more judicial activism. The kind of
judicial activism the Horne Court encouraged may portend a new era of
close substantive scrutiny of statutes based on the policy preferences of a
few judges. Some judges are sensitive to the widespread criticism the Court
endured during the Lochner-era of judicial policymaking in the early
twentieth century. 208 Other judges are not as concerned, possibly seeing
cases like Horne as a license to retire outdated government-subsidy
programs one day and overturn government police powers, like zoning and
environmental law, the next.
Another surprise in Horne—the silver lining of the case for state
governments—is its express ratification of the state sovereign ownership of
wildlife doctrine. A public property right recognized in virtually every
state 209—and now expressly endorsed by the Supreme Court 210—state
206. Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2431.
207. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373
(2003) (discussing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) as an “anti-precedent[],” the symbol
for an “era in which the Supreme Court invalidated nearly two hundred social welfare and
regulatory measures,” like laws setting minimum wages, recognizing union activities, and
establishing pensions for workers). For withering criticism by a well-known Legal Realist, see
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (debunking judicial objectivity, a
cornerstone assumption of Lochner era case law that emphasized dichotomies like
“manufacturing” versus “commerce” and “direct” versus “indirect” effects).
209. See Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 173.
210. See Horne II, 135 S. Ct. at 2431 (“The oysters, unlike raisins, were ‘ferae naturae’ that
belonged to the State under state law, and ‘[n]o individual ha[d] any property rights in them other
than such as the state may permit him to acquire.’” (quoting Leonard v. Earle, 155 Md. 252, 258,
141 A. 714, 716 (1928))).
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sovereign ownership of wildlife implies a trust duty to protect the public’s
property interest. State courts are now free to interpret their wildlife laws
with the assurance that the United States Supreme Court has recognized the
state sovereign ownership doctrine as a defense against takings claims.
Given recent pronouncements from the Court about the importance of state
sovereignty, 211 we think that the Horne Court meant exactly what it said
about state sovereign ownership of wildlife, and that affirmation of plenary
state authority will be Horne’s chief legacy to takings doctrine in the years
ahead.

211. See PPL Montana v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012) (“Under accepted principles
of federalism, the States retain residual power to determine the scope of the public trust over
waters within their borders . . . .”); South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 267 (2010)
(discussing the importance of state sovereignty in the context of water rights); Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007) (recognizing the states’ sovereign interest in submerged lands
affected by climate change and granting standing to the state of Massachusetts to challenge EPA’s
rejection of a petition to regulate carbon emissions under the Clean Air Act).

